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The authors explain the context in which electronic records are being pre-
served. They explain the concept of authentic electronic records and proceed 
with the analysis of the technologies supporting trust in electronic records. 
They start by explaining the Public Key Infrastructure as the requirement for 
electronic signatures, digital certificates, the concept of non-repudiation, 
trusted archive service, timestamps and trusted digital timestamping.  Further, 
they analyse formats of electronic signatures – XMLDSig, XAdES, CAdES, 
PAdES – and their possible influence on the long-term preservation of validity 
of electronically signed records. The authors conclude that although strict re-
quirements of certain types of electronic signatures can ensure authenticity, in-
tegrity and non-repudiation of preserved records, they will still require preser-
vation action on the level of medium and files. 
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Introduction 
Digital documents are being created in every segment of modern business. 
Those documents may or may not be part of a document management system. 
Increasingly they are not printed and signed but are digitally signed instead. At 
that moment they become records. They are used in the process of business and 
later, when they lose their immediate business value, are archived and may or 
                                                     
* The positions put forward in this article are solely those of the authors' and do not necessarily 
reflect the positions of FINA. 
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may not become part of a records management system and stored within a digi-
tal archive solution. If those records are to be preserved in the long-term their 
characteristics of authenticity, reliability, integrity and usability1 have to be pre-
served. 
"Authenticity is not a single concept, but involves different aspects that can be 
associated with an object: 
• A traceable path from the object's original to its current ownership. 
• Measures and techniques for safeguarding against and/or recognizing 
modifications. 
• Techniques for establishing the use of original materials. 
Usage and context define how these aspects are defined for individual classes of 
objects."2 Therefore, as Duranti says, "a document is authentic if it can be 
demonstrated that it is precisely as it was when first transmitted or set aside for 
preservation, and if its reliability, i.e., the trustworthiness it had at that moment, 
has been maintained intact."3 
This shows that the concept of long-term preservation of digital records with the 
abovementioned characteristics requires a complex digital solution. The aim of 
this paper is to give a context in which modern digital documents and records 
are being created, to explain the technologies required to support that process 
and to analyse their influence on long-term preservation of validity of electroni-
cally signed records. Therefore, the concepts of electronic signatures, digital 
certificates, non-repudiation, trusted archive service, timestamps and trusted 
digital timestamping will be explained. For better understanding of those con-
cepts, the concept of Public Key Infrastructure needs to be shortly explained. 
"Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) represents complex information infrastructure, 
which is used to manage electronic identities. Basis of PKI relies on asymmetric 
encryption. Asymmetric encryption actually relies on mathematically related 
key pair, one called the public key, and another called private key, generated to 
be used together. (...) The private key is kept secret and used only by its owner, 
while public key is made available to anyone who wants it."4 Modern systems 
can easily use the keys with length of 2048 characters which are impossible to 
break even by todays supercomputers. 
                                                     
1 As defined by ISO 15489: Information and documentation – Records management, 2001. 
2 Van Diessen, Raymond J. and van der Werf-Davelaar, Titia, Authenticity in a Digital 
Environment, IBM / Koninklijke Bibliotheek Long-Term Preservation Study Report Series, No. 2, 
IBM Netherlands, Amsterdam, December 2002, p. 3, http://www.kb.nl/sites/default/files/docs/2-
authenticity.pdf (22.2.2013) 
3 Duranti, Luciana, The Concept of Electronic Record, in: Duranti, Luciana, Eastwood, Terry and 
MacNeil Heather, Preservation of Integrity of Electronic Records, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
Dordrecht, The Netherlands, 2002, p. 27. 
4 Jacobs, J., Clemmer, L., Dalton, M., Rogers, R., Posluns, J., SSCP Study Guide, Syngress 
Publishing, 2003, pp. 330-331. 
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Technologies and concepts supporting trust in electronic records 
Electronic signature 
There are two types of electronic signatures – basic (usually referred to just as 
"electronic signature") and advanced. The European Telecommunications 
Standards Institute (ETSI) defines electronic signature as "essentially the equiv-
alent of a hand-written signature, with data in electronic form being attached to 
other electronic subject data (invoice, payment slip, contract, etc.) as a means of 
authentication. Electronic signature is not just a 'picture' of the hand written sig-
nature. It is a digital signature that uses a cryptographic transformation of the 
data to allow the recipient of the data to prove the origin and integrity of the 
subject data."5 European legislation in the Directive 1999/93/EC states that an 
electronic signature needs to meet the following requirements in order to be-
come an advanced electronic signature6: 
a) it is uniquely linked to the signatory7; 
b) it is capable of identifying the signatory; 
c) it is created using means that the signatory can maintain under his sole 
control; and 
d) it is linked to the data to which it relates in such a manner that any subse-
quent change of the data is detectable. 
 
Digital certificates 
Digital certificates are digital records used for confirming the identity of a per-
son, an organisation or a machine. Digital certificate is valid during certain pe-
riod of time and contains several additional elements. The Directive 
1999/93/EC allows issuing of the so called qualified certificate which is based 
on the RFC 3039 standard and implements the concept of non-repudiation. The 
qualified certificate must in particular include8:  
a) an indication that the certificate is issued as a qualified certificate; 
b) the identification of the certification-service-provider and the State in 
which it is established; 
c) the name of the signatory or a pseudonym, which shall be identified as 
such; 
                                                     
5 Electronic signature, ETSI, 2012, http://www.etsi.org/index.php/technologies-clusters/ technolo-
gies/security/electronic-signature (9.7.2013) 
6 Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 1999 on a 
Community framework for electronic signatures, Official Journal L 013, 19 January 2000, pp. 12-
20, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/information_society/other_policies/l24118_en.htm (11. 
7.2013) 
7 "A person who holds a signature-creation device and acts either on his own behalf or on behalf 
of the natural or legal person or entity he represents." (Directive 1999/93/EC) 
8 Directive 1999/93/EC. 
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d) provision for a specific attribute of the signatory to be included if rele-
vant, depending on the purpose for which the certificate is intended; 
e) signature-verification data which correspond to signature-creation data 
under the control of the signatory; 
f) an indication of the beginning and end of the period of validity of the cer-
tificate; 
g) the identity code of the certificate; 
h) the advanced electronic signature of the certification-service-provider 
issuing it; 
i) limitations on the scope of use of the certificate, if applicable; and 
j) limits on the value of transactions for which the certificate can be used, if 
applicable. 
 
Certification authority and registration authority 
In the PKI infrastructure digital certificates are issued and revoked by the Certi-
fication Authority (CA). CA is organised as a hierarchy within which a Root 
CA is used as the highest entity, trusting itself, while all other, hierarchically 
lower entities trust the Root CA. The idea is that every identified entity receives 
digital signature, i.e. a certificate of its public key which, in turn, can be used 
for confirm its identity. The procedure is that CA uses its private key to sign the 
digital certificate of an entity, and the identity of that entity can be checked by 
using CA's public key. It is important to mention that, upon the request for certi-
fication by an entity, "a CA checks with a Registration Authority (RA)9 to ver-
ify information provided by the requestor of a digital certificate. If the RA veri-
fies the requestor's information, the CA can then issue a certificate."10 
 
Non-repudiation 
Non-repudiation is a characteristic of a record that prevents any signatory to 
deny the action taken or the content of a record. In the Croatian legislation non-
repudiation is associated with the advanced digital signature which is based 
upon qualified certificate. For a record to achieve and preserve characteristic of 
non-repudiation it is necessary to ensure: 
1. digital identity of signatories, 
2. real-time revocation of digital signature rights, 
                                                     
9 Registration authority, as a part of PKI infrastructure, is "an authority in a network that verifies 
user requests for a digital certificate and tells the certificate authority (CA) to issue it." Search 
Security, s.n. registration authority, January 2006, http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/ 
registration-authority (9.7.2013) 
10 Search Security, s.n. certificate authority (CA), June 2007, http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/ 
definition/certificate-authority (9.7.2013) 
H. Brzica, B. Herceg, H. Stančić, LTP of Validity of Electronically Signed Records 
151 
 
3. time-stamping of digital signatures after checking the list of revoked 
certificates, which ensures the validity of electronic signature at the time 
of signing, and 
4. secure long-term preservation. 
 
Trusted archive service 
Dumortier and Eynde explain that a trusted archive service (TAS) "should 
maintain a set of applications (viewers as well as signature validation applica-
tions) together with the corresponding platforms (hardware, operating systems) 
or at least an emulator of such applications and/or environment in order to guar-
antee that the signature of the document can still be validated years later. To 
achieve this goal in the best possible way, the TAS must only accept documents 
in a format that can still be understood when the format will no longer be in use. 
Only open file formats that are vendor-independent qualify for long term ar-
chiving. (...) Every TAS must therefore publish a list of supported document 
formats. Such a list may be exhaustive or very restricted. Every time a docu-
ment is submitted, the TAS must check the format before accepting it for ar-
chiving."11 
 
Timestamp and trusted digital timestamping 
According to Wallace et al. a digital timestamp is an attestation generated by a 
Time Stamping Authority (TSA) – a trusted service – that a data item existed at 
a certain time.12 Ćosić and Bača explain that "time stamps are typically used for 
logging events, in which case each event in a log is marked with a time stamp. 
In file systems, time stamp may refer to the stored date/time of the file creation 
or modification.  Trusted time stamping is the process of securely keeping track 
of the creation and modification time of a document. (...) Trusted TSA can be 
used to prove the consistency and integrity of digital evidence in every stage of 
its existence."13 
 
Formats of electronic signatures 
In the analysis so far the technologies and concepts supporting trust in elec-
tronic records were explained. It was shown that the concept of electronic sig-
nature can be viewed as the basis for developing all other technologies. Further, 
                                                     
11 Dumortier, Jos and Eynde, Sofie Van den, Electronic Signatures and Trusted Archival Services, 
DAVID Project (2000-2003), p. 7, http://www.expertisecentrumdavid.be/davidproject/teksten/ 
DAVIDbijdragen/Tas.pdf (8.7.2013) 
12 Wallace, C., Pordesch, U. and Brandner R., Long-Term Archive Service Requirements, IETF 
Trust, 2007, p. 5, http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc4810.pdf (9.7.2013) 
13 Ćosić, Jasmin and Bača, Miroslav, (Im)Proving Chain of Custody and Digital Evidence Integ-
rity with Time Stamp, MIPRO – Proceedings of the 33rd International Convention, 2010, pp. 
1227-1228, http://czb.foi.hr/upload/datoteke/10_400%281%29.pdf (9.7.2013) 
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the realisation of digital signatures will be explained through analysis of the 
most important formats of electronic signatures – XMLDSig, XAdES, CAdES 
and PAdES.   
 
XMLDSig 
XML (Extensible Markup Language) Signature is defined by the W3C Recom-
mendation14. In the literature it is referred to as XMLDSig, XML-DSig or 
XML-Sig. The W3C Recommendation states that "XML Signatures can be ap-
plied to any digital content (data object), including XML. An XML Signature 
may be applied to the content of one or more resources." One can differentiate 
between15: 
• detached signature – an XML signature used to sign a resource outside its 
containing XML document, i.e. the signature is over content external to 
the Signature element; 
• enveloped signature – signature is child; it is used to sign some part of its 
containing document, i.e. the signature is over content found within an 
Object element of the signature itself: 
• enveloping signature – signature is parent; it contains the signed data 
within itself, i.e. the signature is over the XML content that contains the 
signature as an element. The content provides the root XML document 
element. Obviously, enveloped signatures must take care not to include 
their own value in the calculation of the SignatureValue. 
"XML Signatures are applied to arbitrary digital content (data objects) via an 
indirection. Data objects are digested, the resulting value is placed in an element 




XAdES (XML Advanced Electronic Signature) "extends XMLDSig specifica-
tion into the domain of non-repudiation by defining XML formats for advanced 
electronic signatures that remain valid over long periods and are compliant with 
the European 'Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 13 December 1999 on a Community framework for electronic sig-
natures' and incorporate additional useful information in common uses cases. 
This includes evidence as to its validity even if the signer or verifying party 
                                                     
14 XML Signature Syntax and Processing (Second Edition), W3C Recommendation, The Internet 
Society & W3C, 10 June 2008, http://www.w3.org/TR/xmldsig-core/ (10.7.2013) 
15 XML Signature, Wikipedia, June 2013, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XML_Signature (10.7. 
2013). 
   XML Signature Syntax and Processing (Second Edition), W3C Recommendation. 
16 XML Signature Syntax and Processing (Second Edition), W3C Recommendation. 
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later attempts to deny (repudiates) the validity of the signature. An advanced 
electronic signature aligned with the present document (i.e. XAdES  specifica-
tion) can, in consequence, be used for arbitration in case of a dispute between 
the signer and verifier, which may occur at some later time, even years later."17 
In relation to XMLDSig, XAdES specification adds six additional, mutually 
nested, forms (see Figure 1): 
1. XAdES (also referred to as XAdES-BES – basic electronic signature) –
basic form defining elements for authentication and protection of integ-
rity of records but not providing non-repudiation of its existence. 
2. XAdES-T (Timestamp) – addition of the timestamp ensures non-repudia-
tion. 
3. XAdES-C (Complete validation data) – builds up on the XAdES-T by 
adding references to the set of data supporting the validation of the elec-
tronic signature (i.e. the references to the certification path and its associ-
ated revocation status information). This form is useful for those situa-
tions where such information is archived by an external source, like a 
trusted service provider. 
4. XAdES-X (eXtended validation data) – builds up on XAdES-C by adding 
timestamps to protect against the risk that any keys used in the certificate 
chain or in the revocation status information may be compromised. 
5. XAdES-X-L (eXtended validation data incorporated for the Long term) – 
builds up on XAdES-X by adding the validation data (i.e. certificates and 
revocation values) for those situations where the validation data are not 
stored elsewhere for the long-term. 
6. XAdES-A (Archiving validation data) – builds up on XAdES-X-L by 
adding time-stamps for archiving signatures 
 
CAdES 
CAdES (CMS Advanced Electronic Signatures) is a set of extensions to CMS 
(Cryptographic Message Syntax) signed data. It "defines a number of electronic 
signature formats, including electronic signatures that can remain valid over 
long periods. This includes evidence as to its validity even if the signer or veri-
fying party later attempts to deny (repudiates) the validity of the electronic sig-
nature."18 Similar to XAdES, CAdES specification defines six profiles, each 
building up on the previous one: CAdES – basic form, CAdES-T (Timestamp), 
CAdES-C (Complete), CAdES-X (eXtended), CAdES-X-L (eXtended Long-
term) and CAdES-A (Archival). The difference between the two specifications 
                                                     
17 XML Advanced Electronic Signatures (XAdES), W3C Note 20 February 2003, ETSI, 2003, 
http://www.w3.org/TR/XAdES/ (10.7.2013) 
18 CMS Advanced Electronic Signatures (CAdES) Technical Specification, ETSI TS 101 733 
v1.7.4,  July 2008, p. 8, http://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_ts/101700_101799/101733/01.07.04_60/ 
ts_101733v010704p.pdf (10.7.2013) 
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   Figure 1: Structure of XAdES specification forms 
 
PAdES 
PAdES (PDF Advanced Electronic Signature) "articulates the same capabilities 
featured in CAdES and XAdES for PDF. (...) PAdES differs from CAdES and 
XAdES in that it applies only to PDF documents and defines requirements that 
PDF viewing and editing software must follow when using digital signatures in 
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PDF documents. As the standard for viewable documents, PDF also defines 
how a signature can be displayed as it might with an ink-on-paper signature at a 
particular position on a particular page, and how digital signatures can be inte-
grated with the form-filling features of PDF. This is a key factor that distin-
guishes it from CAdES and XAdES, which are more suited for applications that 
may not involve human-readable documents."19 PAdES specification is realised 
in 6 parts: 
Part 1 – PAdES Overview – a framework document for PAdES20 
Part 2 – PAdES Basic – Profile based on ISO 32000-1: specifies a PDF sig-
nature as specified in ISO 32000-1:2008 that enables greater interopera-
bility for PDF signatures by providing additional restrictions beyond 
those of ISO 32000-1.21 
Part 3 – PAdES Enhanced: incorporates the signature time-stamp attribute as 
optional making the signature effectively a CAdES-T form.22 
Part 4 – PAdES Long Term: uses an extension to ISO 32000-1 called Docu-
ment Security Store (DSS) to carry such validation data as necessary to 
validate a signature, optionally with Validation Related Information 
(VRI) which relates the validation data to a specific signature.23 
Part 5 – PAdES for XML Content: profile for usage of arbitrary signed (with 
XAdES signatures) XML document that is embedded within a PDF file, 
for providing integrity, authentication and non-repudiation services on the 
data objects that are signed with the XAdES signature.24  
Part 6 – Visual Representations of Electronic Signatures: specifies require-
ments and recommendations for the visual representations of advanced 
electronic signatures (AdES) in PDFs25. The signature appearance is cre-
ated by the signer and any identification included in the signature appear-
ance is not directly verifiable by the AdES signature. However, this in-
formation may be visually checked against the visual representation of 
the electronic signature (AdES) verification.26 
                                                     
19 The AdES family of standards: CAdES, XAdES, and PAdES. Implementation guidance for 
using electronic signatures in the European Union, White paper, Adobe Systems, 2009, p. 5, 
http://blogs.adobe.com/security/91014620_eusig_wp_ue.pdf (10.7.2013) 
20 PAdES. Part 1. 
21 PAdES. Part 2, p. 8. 
22 PAdES. Part 3, p. 7. 
23 PAdES. Part 4, p. 8. 
24 PAdES. Part 5, p. 9. 
25 PAdES. Part 6, p. 5. 
26 Ibid., p. 7. 
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ETSI is developing Part 7 of the PAdES specification: Baseline Profile which 
will address e-Invoicing. The profile will identify a common set of options that 
are appropriate for maximizing interoperability between PAdES signatures. At 
the moment of writing this paper, Part 7 was still in the form of early draft.  
 
 
Figure 2: Comparison of PAdES, CAdES, and XAdES27 
 
Conclusion 
The analysis of technologies and concepts supporting trust in electronic records 
as well as the formats of digital signatures showed important issues that should 
be addressed when long-term preservation of authentic electronic records is 
considered. Setting up a digital archive in accordance with the discussed Di-
rective 1999/93/EC and European Telecommunications Standards Institute's 
advance digital signature specifications can ensure authenticity, integrity and 
non-repudiation of preserved records signed by advance digital signatures 
because they enable possibility of checking the validation chain during the long-
term preservation. However, it is important to keep in mind that majority of so-
lutions explained in this article try to tackle only the problem of long-term 
preservation of electronic signatures, not the actual documents that are signed. 
                                                     
27 The AdES family of standards, p. 7. 
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Therefore, long-term preservation of electronically signed records will, in time, 
still require some kind of preservation action, e.g. emulation or migration. 
Ideally, establishing a trusted archive service based both on advance digital 
signature specifications and proactive approach to digital preservation should 
prove the best solution. 
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